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[Tom Barry, LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT (LIC), THE NEW BATTLEFIELD IN CENTRAL
AMERICA (The Resource Center, Box 4506, Albuquerque, NM 87196), 1986. 60 p.]
This booklet is an in-depth examination of an evolving strategy for the control of third world
wars by the United States. It is required reading for a clear understanding of US policy in Central
America, the principal laboratory for the development of LIC. LIC doctrine is a sophistication of the
counterinsurgency program developed by the Kennedy administration, configured and updated for
application to the rollback features of the "Reagan doctrine."
Its goal is the defeat of nascent self-determination movements throughout the Third World and the
subversion of those governments that have escaped from US hegemony. LIC strategists recognize
that self-determination movements will continue no matter the success of LIC on one or another
battlefields. The US must therefore be prepared for "permanent war" in the Third World. These
wars, Secretary Weinberger believes, constitute the major threat to US foreign policy goals for the
remainder of the century.
LIC coordinates the economic as well as the military strength of the US. Its principal targets are
the "hearts and minds" of the people of both the host and home nations. It eschews the massive
use of US military force, relying instead on Special Operation Forces (SOF), US economic assets,
indigenous military and police, and psychological and "humanitarian" programs. The engagement
of large US military units is not only frowned upon, but its necessity is considered equivalent to
strategic defeat. LIC theorists believe this was the major error in Vietnam where territory, not
people, was targeted.
The limited use of the US military provides an additional bonus, neutralizing home opposition that
during the Vietnam war reflected the steadily growing toll of US servicemen. LIC theory holds that
counterrevolutions can only be won in the context of "nation building," the creation of an alternative
social system to that of the rebels. Client forces must therefore overcome abuses and corruption that
alienate the local population. Further, they should control and direct the non- military aspects of the
war.
The SOF carries out what is euphemistically called "counterterrorist" actions (the CIA handbook,
death squads, etc.), training of client military and police forces, tactical assistance mainly
surveillance and communications , and programs of medical, agricultural and "humanitarian" aid.
US economic power is used in close cooperation with the "pacification" programs (strategic villages)
and is funneled through the Agency for International Development (USAID), the Peace Corps and
private "humanitarian" agencies.
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LIC does not preclude a large-scale invasion by US forces, as Barry points out. He argues that
the limited success of LIC makes this option an increasingly probable one, producing much
larger conflagrations, including nuclear war. Barry also warns "...it is likely that the tenets of LIC
might soon be applied domestically through the authorization of increased domestic intelligence
gathering, psychological operations, control of the media, and covert operations against perceived
internal threat."
In conclusion, Barry calls for a re-arousal of the anti- interventionist sentiment that arose during
the Vietnam war as a direct challenge to the LIC doctrine. The goal should be the replacement of
the LIC doctrine with one that "...conforms to the need for the United States to live in peace with
different political and economic systems." Barry's suggestions for mounting a challenge to LIC may
be the least satisfactory portion of what is otherwise a most valuable document.
The rejection of LIC can only be realized in the context of its specific applications, not its general
theory. Nicaragua is one such place. Here the face of LIC is unmasked and has provoked the
opposition by the majority of informed US public opinion. Another is South Africa where Reagan's
policies have evoked such widespread revulsion that Congress overrode a presidential veto.
The full implications of LIC will become apparent only in the struggle to defeat it where its methods
and purposes are most transparent and, therefore, vulnerable. The mobilization and concentration
of existing sentiment against LIC doctrine applications can permit Nicaraguan Sandinistas to outlast
Reagan, and can help the African National Congress bury apartheid. It is through the dynamics
of these specific campaigns that LIC will be unraveled. *Malcolm Gordon, retired professor of
microbiology, is active in several Central America support group efforts and the disarmament
movement. He is a member of the Central America Update editorial board.
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